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Hooper: The Entirety Clause and Proportionate Reduction Clause - Conflict

THE ENTIRETY CLAUSE AND PROPORTIONATE
REDUCTION CLAUSE --- CONFLICT
AND A SOLUTION
Non-apportionment of royalties is by far the majority
rule in the United States unless some provision is made in
the lease providing for apportionment of royalties. One such
provision is the entirety clause which provides for apportionment in cases where a lessor, subsequent to the lease, transfers or conveys a part of the leased premises. The proportionate reduction clause, however, applies in cases where the
lessor owned less than he purported to lease, and upon discovery his royalty is decreased by the appropriate percentage.
It would seem, therefore, since the entirety clause applies
primarily to prospective conveyances and the proportionate
reduction clause applies retrospectively, that there could be
no conflict. That was the case before the arrival of another
type of entirety clause which added the word "now" to the
clause. With that addition, there is now a possibility of a
conflict between the entirety clause and the proportionate
reduction clause as demonstrated by the Thomas Gilcrease
Foundation v. Standard Oil & Gas Co.1 and Jul-Tex Drilling Company v. Pure Oil Company2 cases to be discussed
later.
The proportionate reduction clause is commonly found
in a lease as follows:
If said lessor owns a less estate in the above described land than the entire and undivided fee
simple estate therein, then the royalties and rentals
herein provided shall be paid the lessor only in the
proportion which his interest bears to the whole and
undivided fee.3
The purpose of the clause is to provide for a reduction in
payments to the lessor if he purports to lease more than his
1. Thomas Gilerease Foundation v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 Tex.
197, 266 S.W.2d 850 (1964).
2. Jul-Tex Drilling Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 201 F. Supp. 874 (D.D.C. 1962).
1962).
3. WILLIAMS & MYERS, OIL AND GAS TERMS, at 196 (1957).
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interest. The clause does not, under the majority view, have
the effect of an apportioning device.4 Representative of this
view is the case of Carlock v. Krug,' where the lease contained a proportionate reduction clause; there is no reference
in the proportionate reduction clause to any future subdividing of the original tract. And absent any provision relating
to apportionment, the general rule is that royalties accruing
from production on a tract go to the owner or owners of that
tract or interest. Generally the only time a proportionate
reduction clause will apply is when an owner of, for example,
a one-quarter undivided interest in a certain tract of land
attempts to lease the whole tract as his own. Of course, his
royalties will be reduced by tliree-fourths. Under the majority rule, an owner of 100 acres who leases that acreage and
later sells 50 acres outright to another party will not share
in the royalties if oil is produced on the acreage sold by virtue
of the proportionate reduction clause in the lease. It was
because of non-apportionment that the entirety clause was
formulated and is now commonly found in leases.'
The general form of the entirety clause is:
If the leased premises are hereafter owned in severalty or in separate tracts, the premises, nevertheless, shall be developed and operated as an entirety,
and royalties shall be paid to each separate owner in
the proportion that the acreage owned by him bears
to the entire leased acreage.7
Courts have had difficulty deciding cases which have an entirety clause in them and the issue is one of the division of
royalties. Questions of intent,8 mistake, and reformation'
have entered in but overall the courts have found the clause
to be valid, effective, and not against public policy.
Representative of those cases giving effect to the entirety
clause are Krone v. Lacy1" and Hoffman v. Sohio Petroleum
4. McCoy,

The Entirety Clause-Its Current Use and Interpretation, 12

ROCKY MT. MIN. L. INST. 317, 319 (1967).

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

151 Kan. 407, 99 P.2d 858 (1940).
McCoy, supra note 4, at 320.
WILLIAMS & MYERS, supra note 3, at 85.
Gypsy Oil Co. v. Schonwald, 107 Okla. 253, 231 P. 864 (1924).
Harley v. Magnolia Petroleum Oil Co., 378 Ill. 19, 37 N.E.2d 760 (1941).
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Company.1 In the Krone case the lessor owned a 2,400 acre
tract of land, the lease on the land containing an entirety
clause. Subsequent to the lease the lessor conveyed an undivided one-half interest in 160 acres and a one-fourth undivided interest in 320 acres to the same grantee. The conveyances were made "subject to" the lease. The 480 acres later
started producing oil and the grantee claimed royalties of
one-fourth and one-half on his interests. The Court, however, held that the grantee was entitled only to a one-fifteenth
royalty by reason of the entirety clause in the deed. The
grantee had a net interest of 80 acres in the 160 acre property
and a net interest of 80 acres in the 320 acre property giving
him a net total interest of 160 acres. This interest as compared
to the leased premises of 2,400 acres gave the grantee onefifteenth of the one-eighth royalty. In Hoffman the oil and
gas lease containing an entirety clause covered the north
half of a section of land. The tract was later partitioned
with the east half going to the plaintiff and the west half to
the defendant. These sales were made subject to the lease
and when a producing well was drilled on the west half the
Court held that plaintiff was entitled to his proportionate
share of the royalties. It is important to note that in both of
these cases the entirety clause was of the "now or hereafter"
type. But since the partitions and conveyances were made
subsequent to the lease no problem was encountered with the
proportionate reduction clause.
The above cases and examples describe how the entirety
clause and proportionate reduction clause work with respect
to prospective and retrospective division of the leased premises. If, however, we taken an entirety clause with the
words "If the leased premises are now or shall hereafter be
owned in severalty or in separate tracts . . . ," add a proportionate reduction clause to the lease and put them into a certain fact situation, problems can arise. One of the first cases
to consider such a problem was Thomas Gilorease Foundation
v. Stanolind Oil and Gas Company. 2 The fact situation was
10. Krone v. Lacy, 168 Neb. 792, 97 N.W.2d 528 (1959).
11. Hoffman v. Sohio Petroleum Co., 179 Kan. 84, 292 P.2d 1107 (1956).
12. Thomas Gilcrease Foundation v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., supra note 1.
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this: Gilcrease owned a three-fourths mineral interest in the
northeast quarter of a section and a one-fourth interest in the
northwest quarter of the section. The lease purported to
cover the full interest in both quarters. Stanolind also had
a lease of a one-fourth interest in each quarter from a bank
and had an operating agreement with two other companies
owning the remaining one-half interest in the northwest
quarter. Both quarters had producing wells, but the wells on
the northwest quarter were producing a much greater amount
of oil.
The lease of the Gilcrease interest contained an entirety
clause of the "now or hereafter type" and a proportionate
reduction clause. The Gilcrease Foundation brought suit
claiming a 50 percent royalty in the total leased area rather
than a 75 percent royalty in the northeast quarter and a 25
percent royalty in the northwest quarter. The basis of its
claim was that at the time of the lease the ownership was in
"severalty or in separate tracts" notwithstanding the fact
that their interest in both quarters was an undivided interest.
Therefore, by virtue of the entirety clause they were entitled
to a 50 percent royalty from the leased premises rather than
a royalty figured on the basis of their ownership in each
quarter.
The Supreme Court of Texas overruled Stanolind's arguments that the ownership was not in "severalty or in separate tracts," that the entirety clause could not be construed
to enlarge the lessee's obligations and that the proportionate
reduction clause operated to prevent Gilerease from claiming
a 50 percent royalty in a tract they had only a one-fourth interest in. The Court held that at the time the lease was
made Gilcrease did own the premises "in severalty or in
separate tracts" and that the entirety clause applied. This
holding represents a situation where the entirety clause and
the proportionate reduction clause conflict.
The real difficulty here arose because of the definition
given by the Court to the term leased premise. The Court
said: "We have been cited no authority to the effect that
ownership in different undivided interests in segregated porhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol5/iss2/11
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tions of the leased premises does not qualify as an ownership
in separate tracts.""s In other words, the Court broke away
from the traditional view that the leased premises is only that
tract where the producing well is located. Put still another
way, "the leased premises are not the entire land, but only
the interest therein subject to the lease."' 4 Had the proportionate reduction clause been applied, the Gilcrease royalty
in the northwest quarter would have been set at 25 percenttheir interest therein.
Another case considering this problem is Jul-Tex Drilling Company v. Pure Oil Company. 5 Here, the Nelsons (defendants) owned the following interests: three-fourths interest in the west one-half of the northeast quarter of Section 3
(60 acres), the northeast quarter of Section 15 (160 acres),
and one-fourth interest in the northwest quarter of Section 4
(40 acres), giving them a total of 260 mineral acres. The
acres described in the lease totalled 400; the other interests
are of no importance to this discussion. Section 4 is the only
producing area in the lease. The Nelsons claimed a 260/400
interest in the royalties of the well by virtue of the entirety
clause-a "now and hereafter" type-in the lease. This
would have the effect of raising the lessee's royalty payments
from 121/2 percent to 171/2 percent if the court found for the
defendants.
The District Court of Colorado took a different approach
from the one in Gilcrease, however, and held that the Nelsons
were entitled to a one-fourth of one-eight royalty by reason of
their ownership in Section 4. They found the entirety clause
inapplicable and applied the proportionate reduction clause
instead. Their reason for this was that they construed
leased premises as not including the entire land but restricting its meaning to the interest subject to the lease. Furthermore, they held as the Court in Gilcrease did that the land
was not owned in its entirety by one lessor. So, as can be
13. Id. at 853.

14. O'Quinn, "Separately Owned Tracts Under Single Lease As Affected By
Entirety Clause And Related Provisions," quoting Don Emery of the Oklahoma City Bar, EIGHTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON OIL AND GAS LAW AND
TAXATION, 125, 157 (1957).
15. Jul-Tex Drilling Co. v. Pure Oil Co., supra note 2.
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seen from the Gilcrease and Jul-Tex cases, the conflict between the entirety clause and proportionate reduction clause
arises by the interpretation of leased premises given by the
Court.
Further decisions in this area, although there are only
a few, indicate that the problem has not been resolved. The
rule announced in the Gilcrease case is still the law in Texas,
and at least one other court has indicated that if it were faced
with a similar situation it would hold the same way. In
Stroud v. D-X Sunray Oil Co. 6 the Court said with reference
to the entirety clause:
If the word 'now' or a word of similar meaning is
used, the clause no doubt applies to minerals held in
severalty at the time the lease is executed but
not so where the phrase 'hereafter be owned' is
used as it was in the clause under consideration."
It was for this reason (the entirety clause being of the "hereafter" type rather than the "now and hereafter" type) that

the Court in Stroud said it could not follow the holding in the
Gilcrease case.
Thus we are left with two different approaches to the
same problem. A closer examination of the holdings in the
Gilerease and Jul-Tex cases will indicate that the Jul-Tex
theory is preferable. Gilcrease can be carried to an extreme
to indicate how mistaken the holding is.

Suppose eight

landowners surround a tract of land in which they each own
an undivided one-eighth interest. (See Appendix A.) Further,
they each separately lease their own tract plus tract E to an
oil company, under a lease with an entirety clause of the
"now and hereafter" type. Under the Giloreaseruling each
landowner would be entitled to a nine-sixteenths of one-eighth
royalty if oil were produced on tract E. That would
total four and one-half times the one-eighth royalty traditionally paid. Conversely, if oil were produced on one
of the individually owned tracts, the oil company would be
required to pay only nine-sixteenths of one-eighth royalty.
16. 376 P.2d 1015 (OkIa. 1962).
17. Id. at 1019
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In either case the result would be inequitable. However,
under the ruling in Jul-Tex (using the same example)
if oil were produced on tract E, each owner of a one-eighth
undivided interest would be entitled to a one-eighth of oneeighth royalty. Further, if oil were produced on one of the
individually owned tracts, that owner would take the full oneeighth royalty. The only valid criticism that can be made
of this distribution of royalties is that it might violate the
intent of the parties. That is, the Court under the Jul-Tex
holding would be applying the proportionate reduction clause
rather than the entirety clause. Perhaps the only conclusion
one can reach concerning the Gilerease case and the use of
the entirety clause is that, if the lessor does not own the same
interest in every tract of land covered in the lease, an entirety
clause of the "now or hereafter" type should not be used."
Further solutions to this conflict can be found in the
use of various other apportioning devices. They are: pooling
or unitization agreements," proportionate reduction clauses
(minority rule),2" entirety clauses of the "hereafter" type,2'
community leases," and space and drilling regulations.2 3 This
is by no means an exhaustive list of alternatives. The Court
may also consider the duty of fair dealing and the intent of
the parties.2 4 Whatever alternative, if any, is employed will
of course depend on the jurisdiction and the land and interests being leased. The above considerations may indicate
that the lease, in many cases, will have to be tailor-made for
the situation. Knowing that problems can and do arise by
use of the entirety clause should be a warning to all that a
standard lease form is not appropriate in many cases. This
is especially applicable in those cases involving landowners
with different interests in different tracts of land. In these
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

McCoy, supra note 4, at 368.
Wells v. Continental Oil Co., 244 Miss. 509, 142 So.2d 215 (1962).
Wettengal v. Gormley, 160 Pa. 559, 28 A. 934 (1894).
Stroud v. D-X Sunray Oil Co., supra note 14.
French v. George, 159 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942).
Orders by state legislatory bodies concerning where the well or wells must
be drilled in order to get an efficient drain and how the owners are to
share the royalties, e.g., Oklahoma.
24. 2 WILLIAMS & MYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW, §§ 521.1-521.8 (Supp. 1969).
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cases it may be wise to eliminate the entirety clause altogether and rely on some other apportioning device. 5
DAVE HOOPER

APPENDIX A

X-Producing
Well
D

E

G

H

I

Tracts A, B, C, D, F, G, H, and I are individually owned.
Tract E is owned by the owners of the other tracts (oneeighth undivided interest each).
Each owner has a 9/16 interest in leased area.
9/16 X 8 = 72/16 = 41/

/8 royalty.

25. Very helpful to this analysis besides those references previously noted was
Hardwicke & Hardwicke, Apportionment of Royalty to Separate Tracts:
The Entirety Clause and the Community Lease, 32 TExAs L. REv. 660 (1954).
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